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IN THE NEWS. FOUNDATIONS: New Ford grants incl. \$800M to SSRC to finance its grants-in-aid programs for research on Near and Middle East, Africa, China; \$350M to *Amer. Bar Assoc.* for series of intl. conferences among lawyers; \$250M to Columbia U. to support for. newspaper execs.' seminars, to be conducted by *Amer. Press Inst.*; another \$250M to Columbia, for Russian-American student exchange; \$250M to Northwestern for research, grad. training in intl. relations and African studies; \$250M to Stanford U. for research, grad. training in intl. relations and foreign policy research, plus \$110M for research on econ. history of Portuguese Africa by its *Ford Research Inst.*; \$150M to *Intl. Press Inst.* for research, seminars, regional meetings; \$100M to *Amer. Council of Learned Societies* for exchange of Russian, American humanistic and social science scholars; \$100M to *Govtl. Affairs Inst.* for correspondents' seminars. * * * Ford also granted a total of \$328.8M to 35 academic presses for publications in humanities and social sciences, \$103.2M for fellowship awards to law professors for legal and public affairs research. * * * Falk F. made four grants to support work in political education: \$80M to *Citizenship Clearing House*, \$32.6M to Vanderbilt U., \$28M to MIT, \$17.5 to Rollins. * * * CBS F. awarded 8 news and public affairs fellowships at Columbia U.

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Political Life in the Urban Centers of Senegal: A Study of a Period of Transition

Senegal and Sudan presently comprise the Mali Federation, which is in the process of achieving sovereignty within the French Community. Senegal itself is one of the most urbanized West African regions, and its cities have been characterized by a gradual growth of modern political life. The author presents some major findings on its urban political activity, based on extensive interviews made in the mid-1950's. The oldest urban elite, almost entirely assimilated into the French way of life, has been only partially successful in developing party organizations that satisfy the interests of the newer urban residents. As a consequence, the most active and radical post-war political activity has been centered in "non-political" bodies, notably labor unions. Also, urban political activity has been increasingly challenged by rural political developments, which have drawn their framework from urban politics. African specialists will note that Senegalese political development has much in common with such development elsewhere in Africa; it also has a number of distinctive features.

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THE AFRICAN URBAN MILIEU

It has been emphasized for some time that an essential characteristic of most cities in sub-Sahara Africa is that they were a "creation of the whites." For the sociologist, the outstanding feature of the African urban milieu is that it is a "drastically new milieu." With a few exceptions, the most important of these cities were founded quite recently, and lie within the framework of colonial history. Those whose functional development and population growth in the past two decades have been most spectacular for the most part date back less than a century. In these cities African urban problems are most apparent, and hence they have more quickly drawn the attention of researchers. The essential concepts of the urbanization process in sub-Sahara Africa have been formulated in this context.

The diversity in these urban situations should not be underestimated, however; it is especially important in the study of

problems arising from political activities. Cities founded in the slave-trade period have traits that distinguish them from the more recent colonial cities, and any discussion of Senegalese cities must take full account of such a distinction.

To be sure, "old cities" and "recent cities"¹ have one fundamental trait in common: both are entirely the products of external compulsion. In the rural districts, the controls introduced by the colonial power impinged on integrated, settled societies, whose solidarity and coherence often enabled them at least to check and moderate external influences, and to confine them to given channels. In the colonial cities, however, foreign activity itself created the framework in which it operated. Its principal effect was to bring together a conglomerate and poorly-integrated population, which from the outset was confronted by novel problems and upon which the agencies of change acted with maximum intensity. This condition is essential in the consideration of problems of political life in an urban milieu.

¹ An instrumental distinction whose meaning is explained below. For an examination of some criteria making possible the definition of different types of colonial cities, cf. P. Mercier, "Aspects de la société africaine dans l'agglomération dakaroise: groupes familiaux et unités de voisinage," in *L'agglomération dakaroise. Quelques aspects sociologiques et démographiques*. I.F.A.N., Dakar, 1954.

Even at this juncture, however, effects of the distinction between old and recent cities are apparent. The growth of the old slave-trade cities took place in two stages. In the first, there was a fairly slow tempo of growth in which the elements comprising the city were united into a relatively integrated whole. In the second stage, corresponding to the recent colonial period, population growth was much more rapid; new strata of city-dwellers appeared, so numerous that the original city could not effectively assimilate them. A series of problems arose from the relations between the comparatively stable nucleus and the weakly-structured host of new arrivals. In Senegal these relations were originally hostile, yet played an important role in certain phases of urban political life.

The complexity of the principal traits of political phenomena in the framework of the colonial cities is suggested in the following discussion.

The Traditional and Modern Frameworks

African urban centers were established more or less wholly beyond the limits of traditional political units.² They were distinguished by novel activities and functions, quickly acquired a cosmopolitan aspect, and received a meager administrative organization. As privileged centers for Europeans, they could hardly survive except through a system of direct administration, and withdrew more or less rapidly from the local, pre-European political systems and authorities, which were in no way equipped to absorb them. Yet political problems of the traditional sort were not entirely excluded from urban life. In certain cases the territory of an indigenous political system was largely or wholly incorporated by the city, and officially recognized.³ Colonial authorities at first assumed only the radi-

cally new functions that the old system could not manage, but this phase of internal autonomy was brief. The new government progressively assumed all political functions, and the population of the city became diversified. Effective operation of the traditional authority was then limited to the one ethnic group that henceforth furnished its members. Nevertheless, despite its increasingly ambiguous position and more and more purely formal character, despite the fact that it had no genuine initiative, traditional authority continued to play a role in urban life. Old political systems eventually were used by the modern political organizations as one of the props for their own action, and conversely, some traditional authorities attempted to reinforce their declining influence by insinuating themselves into a new political role.

These interactions merit attention. In effect, traditional political forms were taken over into the framework of urban life, though in rudimentary outline. This was the case in ethnic group and ward organization, for example, which involved the institutions of "ward-chieftainship" and "race-chieftainship." These were often developed spontaneously, sometimes assuming a clandestine nature. In other cases such organizational forms were encouraged and given official recognition. Some were created out of whole cloth by the colonial authority, which saw in them an effective means for regulating populations still poorly integrated into the framework that it was striving to establish.⁴ The role of authorities having traditional origins quickly became secondary, of course, but it has raised contradictions that make the study of interpenetration between traditional and modern political frameworks an essential one.

² Their territory, at least in the case of the oldest cities, was often the object of a "concession" by local authorities, and was therefore withdrawn from their direct control.

³ This is the case, for example, of Lagos; regarding Dakar, where the authorities of the "Republic of Lebou" had their seat, cf. C. Michel, "L'organisation coutumière (sociale et politique) de la communauté Laboue de Dakar," *Bull. du Comité d'Et. hist. et sci. de l'A.O.F.*, March 17, 1934; and C. Faure, *Histoire de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert et des origines de Dakar*, Paris, 1914.

⁴ G. Balandier, in *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires* (Paris, 1955) shows clearly the occurrence there of "a transfer onto an urban milieu of leadership agencies already existing in a rural milieu: the

The New Political Life

More importantly, the urban centers deserve attention because of the role they have played in the development of a radically new type of political life, one whose forms have been largely borrowed from outside Africa. The first attempts at political organization and activity were born in the cities. More recently some political movements have appeared in a rural context, as a reflection of rural conditions, but they have drawn much of their pattern from the cities, or from among elements subject to urban influences.

The modern African city presents a set of conditions favorable to the development of especially intense political reactions. The position of the colonizing power is most sharply apparent in the city, and the instruments of its power are concentrated there. The rootless condition of the African population seems at its extreme; the masses that gather in the city are unsettled, poorly established in their occupations, and suffer from every form of insecurity. The new elites created and shaped by urban life feel restricted and disappointed in their desires for social advancement and for a share in authority and in modern symbols of prestige.⁵ Finally, the city brings together a white society and a Negro society, though often clearly separated by topography. In these circumstances racial tensions can develop to their maximum. Moreover, they assume varied aspects, e.g., competitive situations in various spheres, official or unofficial discrimination.⁶ Intense reactions to such conditions may take no organized form and may not manifest themselves except after some delay, however. Here the

problem of the "old cities" is again relevant. In them, such reactions can remain unorganized or marginal longer in relation to the official forms of political expression. We shall see that this is typical of certain Senegalese cities.

Furthermore, some reactions are born and expressed in a much larger framework than that of political life in its strictest sense of party activity. Demands for justice in the colonial situation can be expressed on different planes and in different fields. In South Africa, for example, Africans are largely barred from social and political action, and the chief demands emerge in religious activities.⁷ Elsewhere, political life may not be forbidden, but its forms of expression are limited, either openly or in fact—for instance, by means of a judicial system in which people cannot file a case. Thus, the most radical demands are formulated not within the framework of parties — at least, in their official platforms — but in that of unions or other associations. Attitudes, behaviors, and ideologies are formed in such organizations, pending the possibility of full expression at the political level. In the urban centers of Senegal some of the most important popular forces, at least prior to the great transformations that began in 1956, were to be found outside parties.

The Growth of Rural Political Life

These fundamental demands of the urban population provide models for similar demands that spread from the cities into rural districts. The general preponderance of the cities in political initiative is mentioned above. They are both centers of attraction and centers for the diffusion of foreign influences. An im-

hierarchy of administrator-mayor, administrator-deputy mayor, and ward leader corresponds to the hierarchy of regional leader, district leader, and cantonal leader" (p. 169). The contradictions that he points out in the administrative organization of Brazzaville were sharper still at Dakar: the institution of appointed ward leaders coexisted with that of an elected city government, whose relations with the colonial administration did not differ in principle from those of French city governments with prefectural authority.

⁵ Cf. P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).

Groupeement européen de Dakar: orientations d'une enquête," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.* XIX, 1955.

⁶ Cf. *Infra.*, and the Summary Notes Given in P. Mercier, "Aspects de la Société Africaine" and "Le

⁷ Cf. B. G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, London, 1948; and G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire*, Paris, 1955.

portant part of the urban population has considerable mobility, and thus maintains solid ties and frequent communication with the regions of its origins.⁸ Moreover, lesser members of the modern urban elites, e.g., workers and petty officials, have been settled in rural centers, thus extending urban influence still further. By these means a double network of individuals more or less shaped by the conditions of urban life is established. Contacts and relations between urban centers and rural districts can vary markedly, however. The area affected by the prestige of political leaders thus may be more or less extensive. The forms of activity and organization created in the city generally can be transplanted to rural sectors only in their rudimentary forms.

In Senegal, historical factors account for the sharp division between city and countryside. In the old coastal cities, a separatistic history and a particular juridical status have contributed to their marginal position in Senegalese life. The consequences of the separation between the former "citizens" of "the four communes" and the former "subjects" of the interior⁹ have not been entirely wiped out, even in recent years.

From the foregoing points of view, Senegalese urban political life can be oriented in summary fashion to the general problems of urban political life. A series of particular traits in the Senegalese situation are first interpreted against the historical background. The subsequent section summarizes the results of investigations conducted in certain Senegalese centers in 1953-1955, during a period of transition between two major phases in the development of political life.¹⁰

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CITIES OF SENEGAL

In all of West Africa, the phenomenon of urbanization has been most extensive and the variety of its forms most striking in Senegal. The area has about ten communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants each; five of these have well over 30,000 inhabitants and the major urban center, Dakar, has almost 250,000 inhabitants. The urban population exceeds 500,000, about one quarter of the total population. The present urban pattern has no link with a pre-European tradition. Some of the cities wield influence over extensive suburban zones, and the distances separating them are relatively short, so that the western half of Senegal is covered by a close network of urban centers.

Partial administration of municipal affairs and familiarity with electoral machinery are by no means recent acquisitions. The first African communes "with full powers"¹¹ were created in Senegal, in the second half of the 19th century, and there the first "mixed communes"¹² were developed, at the beginning of the 20th century. Among all the French West African territories, Senegal contained the largest number of constituted communes, and alone had almost a quarter of the communes with full powers created in all French Overseas Territories by the law of 1956. As early as 1925 there were 18 communes, of which four had full autonomy. The exercise of political rights in modern form dates back more than 75 years for some cities, and by 1953 there were elected municipal councils in 14 of the 20 mixed communes in Senegal.

⁸ These facts were studied by M. Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest*, London, 1936, among others.

⁹ Cf., *infra*, summary historical comments regarding the development of citizenship in the oldest Senegalese settlements.

¹⁰ After 1956, changes occurred more rapidly. There were profound transformations in the orientations of political parties, in the organization of unions, etc. These transformations acquired greater significance in the new legislative and constitutional frameworks instituted in 1957 and subsequently.

¹¹ These had an organization patterned after that of French communes, even though the conditions under which they operated were not always comparable. It was not until 1956, 75 years later, that communes were established in territories other than Senegal.

¹² These were all characterized by the fact that their mayor was a representative of the French colonial administration. There were various types, according to whether the city council was entirely appointed, or partially or entirely elected. Between the two wars they expanded rapidly outside Senegal.

"The Four Communes of Senegal"

The four coastal cities have had the longest experience with political rights. All are fairly old; Dakar was founded most recently, in 1857. St. Louis of Senegal, founded in the time of the slave-trade, is the oldest, and a typical example of the "old colonial city." In 1659 a warehouse of the Company of the Senegal was built on the site, the first French settlement in the region. It was a commercial post oriented toward the river, and a small military outpost; it became the jumping-off place for the conquest of the African territories. The general traits of the old African city may still be found in St. Louis' central section, despite recent changes. In such a center the African population was relatively stable.¹³ A few European families established residence, and a rather important mixed-blood population developed. By the mid-19th century an urban community with a homogeneous way of life had emerged.

The Isle of Gorée, which became the second commune in Senegal, was occupied in 1677; it was oriented toward the Petite-Cote and the factories of Rufisque, Joal, and Portudal. Of these, only Rufisque developed; it became the third commune. St. Louis and Gorée underwent many vicissitudes before 1815, when they were restored to France. They then returned to "legal" commerce, which was centered in the valley of the Senegal. St. Louis retained its dominance. By the end of the 18th century it had had nearly 7,000 inhabitants, about half of whom were free and almost a tenth European. In the 1870's its population was about 15,000, while Gorée had but 3,000; Rufisque was growing as was Dakar. Finally, the interior back of the Petite-Cote was opening up, and Thiès was founded. In the following period St.

Louis stagnated¹⁴ and Gorée declined, losing people at the expense of Dakar and Rufisque; Rufisque grew rapidly, as the port for the ground-nut. Dakar entered a period of prosperity at the turn of the century.¹⁵ During the late 19th century the composition of the population already was beginning to change fairly rapidly, especially in the expanding centers, but the old core of urban population continued to hold a dominant place, not only in urban life but also in the colony of Senegal as a whole, whose constitution had come into effect. The people of St. Louis most notably served as essential instruments of the colonization effort.

This dominance was expressed very clearly in the political realm. The coastal cities, in contrast to the interior cities and rural areas, had been introduced to the structure and organization through which modern political life is conducted long before the reforms of 1946. Political activity of the modern type was first limited to the European settlers but was soon extended to the mixed-blood element and then to the Negro population. Beginning in the late 18th century, St. Louis had a mayor, always a mixed-blood, who served as intermediary between the governor and the populace. In 1789 the colony participated in metropolitan political activities, sending to the States-General a petition of grievances that demanded commercial freedom — *i.e.*, abolition of the Company monopoly — and the end of slavery. A satisfactory agreement was reached among employees of the Company, European businessmen, and mixed-blood businessmen, but it was never brought to fruition; a period of disorder set in and persisted until the rebirth of the colony in 1815.

In 1833 French citizenship was conferred upon all free inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée by royal decree. Citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of

¹³ We have observed that in such cases a "people belonging to the city" emerged. Their ties with their birthplaces were more or less completely severed.

¹⁴ It had scarcely 20,000 inhabitants in 1920, but its growth resumed in the 1930's. In 1954 it had a population of 39,000.

¹⁵ With the creation of a harbor, which captured the trade of Rufisque, whose modernization appeared impossible, and the installation of the government-general of French West Africa, established in 1895.

the two cities with the abolition of slavery in 1848.¹⁶ The four coastal cities were elevated to the status of communes with full powers between 1872 and 1887, and the organization of political life on a European pattern in the four communes crystalized the opposition between the citizens of the old settlements and the subjects of the territories in the newly-conquered interior. The cities alone provided apprenticeship in public life and in the representative system. Beginning in 1871 they elected a deputy to the French Parliament. In 1879 they elected a Council-general patterned after those in France, supposedly to represent all Senegal. It actually represented only the few urban centers, whose interests at the time diverged widely from those of the rest of Senegal. An effort was subsequently made to repair this breach by transforming the Council-general into a colonial council, consisting of representatives elected by the citizens and representatives for the non-citizens appointed by the *notables*.¹⁷ This reduced conflicts scarcely at all. Meanwhile, citizenship acquired new importance. At first it was established by local law and had no effect in other French territories. Not until 1916 did the "natives of the four communes" receive full French citizenship while still being able to retain their personal status. These citizens were few in number: scarcely 80,000 in 1939, about 100,000 in the 1950's. The cities tended to include more non-citizens than citizens as they grew. Actual participation in politics developed only gradually. At the first legislative elections, in 1871, only a third of those registered voted, and the rate dropped to less than a fifth

in some years. Since the beginning of the 20th century, however, urban citizens have taken an increasingly lively interest in political matters.¹⁸

In this restricted political system the relative importance of the roles played by different ethnic groupings and different cities varied continuously. Ethnic dominance, first held by the old European families, passed gradually to mixed-blood society, which came into being in the 18th century and rapidly acquired wealth, education, and influence. By the mid-19th century mixed-bloods made up the majority of the westernized population. But the entry of the emancipated slaves, the first sizable migration toward the cities, quickly reduced the mixed-bloods to a minority. In 1900 they numbered less than 5,000 in the four communes together, though for several decades their economic and political influence remained quite disproportionate to their numbers. Among the cities, St. Louis was predominant until WW I. At the beginning of the century it practically controlled the deputation to the French legislature and the Council-general — and hence the economic life of the territory. Then Gorée-Dakar came to the fore;¹⁹ in 1914 a citizen of Gorée, Blaise Diagne, was elected deputy, followed by Galandou Diouf and Lebou. These men were the first elected Senegalese to win broad support at Paris; Diagne himself was appointed a Secretary of State [a subministerial post, equivalent to a U.S. Under-Secretary]. In Senegal, the authority of elected officials — deputies and Councillors-general — increased, and clashes with the civil administration were frequent.²⁰

¹⁶ Which nearly tripled the number of citizens, who henceforth comprised a body that was more heterogeneous but less completely "assimilated."

¹⁷ Translator's note: the *notables* were influential residents appointed to high political offices in the interior by the local representative of French government.

¹⁸ Especially after 1914, when there appeared a particularly dynamic personage, Blaise Diagne, whose popularity was widespread.

¹⁹ Dakar absorbed Gorée in 1929. The latter was reestablished as a separate commune in 1956.

²⁰ At first — at the end of the 19th century — these were conflicts between the merchants, upholding the interests of their agencies, and the civil administration, then engaged in an expansionist policy in West Africa, whose advantages the former could not see. Not until recent years did these conflicts change very much in character.

The Growth of Political Parties

This political tradition explains why the changes in Senegal after 1946 took a unique coloring, and why Senegal's subsequent political history has been considerably different from that of other French West African territories. The political changes instituted after WW II represented in part a loss of privileged position for the four communes, though they continued to play a dominant role for several years.²¹ This was one of the factors that made the period 1946-1956 one of transition.

One important development was the appearance of well-structured political parties. Pre-war political life had been characterized by clusters of followers assembled about influential leaders, in a framework that somewhat resembled that of a "republic of notables." This pattern was still common in 1946; the nature of parties changed only gradually. On the other hand, political life broadened to include the whole territory. The long-standing predominance enjoyed by the coastal cities persisted for a few years but the weight of their electorate fell rapidly.²² The emerging ideologies and the newly-founded political organizations were oriented toward the satisfaction of wants quite different from those typical of the old urban populations. But the models and the leaders that the latter had produced retained an influence that greatly exceeded their geographic limits, and in the cities they receded only slowly before the growth of a political life with different roots.

The fact that the post-war institutional developments were not transplanted to virgin soil had two contradictory results. On the one hand, a political party that was merely a branch of a

French party — the S.F.I.O.²³ — developed and for several years played a dominant role throughout Senegal. In the other territories parties were more often purely local, and simply allied themselves with the French parties. The S.F.I.O. lost its predominance in Senegal after 1951, but kept it in the four communes — St. Louis and Dakar-Gorée being its chief strongholds; it remained there as the African Socialist Movement.²⁴ This result, the adoption of assimilationist views, was to a certain degree a characteristic of pre-war political life, but on the other hand it contributed to the leadership of the first party that tried to be at once interterritorial and specifically African: the African Democratic Assembly (R.D.A.). It provided some of the most radical elements in the movement, which received considerable support, especially at Dakar. Several radical leaders were the source of the conflicts that resulted in the split in the R.D.A. that followed the change of orientation after 1950. The R.D.A. was subsequently a rather marginal movement in Senegal. This second result suggests the strength of the relations of a party limited to the numerous elite of the old Senegalese cities with the great European currents of political thought.

But the greatest effect of the diversification of Senegalese political life was felt elsewhere. The appearance and rapid success of the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (B.D.S.) — which stemmed from a division in the S.F.I.O. — were the manifestations, in the political realm, of two essential facts: (1) the important changes that had taken place in the composition of city populations; and (2) the resumption of initiative by the rural populations, who seized the opportunity to express themselves directly, and especi-

²¹ A very significant portion of the present framework emerged from the "four communes."

²² Until 1957, universal suffrage existed only in the four communes. In the rest of Senegal the franchise, which was very limited in 1946, was extended to more and more people. The organic law of 1956 abolished all restrictions.

²³ Translator's note: French section of the Workingmen's International: the French Socialist Party, attached to the old Second International.

²⁴ In 1956. The municipal elections of the same year showed clearly the extent of its influence, which was unimportant in the interior cities.

ally to express themselves in opposition to the old cities. The legislative elections of 1951 were typical in this respect. The enlarged rural electorate had numerical control and held the key to success in the elections; a substantial part of the urban masses shared in an effort to drive a breach in the old system of urban domination. In this period the ideological aspects of the political parties were still unimportant. The elections of 1951 were a victorious revolt of the new citizens, urban and rural, against the old citizens of the "four communes."²⁵ The two candidates of the B.D.S. won. Significantly, one of them represented directly, through the unions, the new forces. The division between the whole of the territory and the cities was thus repeated *within* the cities. A new phase had commenced, one in which politics became more complicated. But the forms that can be termed "traditional" for political life were too deeply embedded within the patterns of urban life to give way at once.

SENEGALISE POLITICAL LIFE IN TRANSITION, 1953-1956

It was under such conditions that researches were conducted on the forms of political expression in several Senegalese urban centers, chiefly at Dakar-Gorée and at St. Louis — that is, three of the four communes — and also at Thiès, a newer city in the interior close to and under the influence of the Dakar-Gorée-Rufisque aggregate. This last study provided certain comparative materials. This essay discusses only some of the findings of these researches. Three essential facts must be remembered:

(1) The importance retained by certain long-standing patterns. A party de-

signed to be distinctive, and to a degree founded in opposition to these patterns, nevertheless conforms with them, at least for a time, within the "old cities." This is one of the limits of the political system of this period: the deepest political aspirations, which are rapidly gaining strength, can be only partially expressed within a partisan structure.

(2) The central role of certain non-political groupings and organizations²⁶ in the elaboration of more radical ideologies and in the formation of the most active groups. This must be viewed as a direct function of the preceding condition.

(3) The temporarily marginal status of an important part of the new elites, whose formation had accelerated in the post-war years. At the time of study, a shift of elites was occurring. Youthful elements were vigorously opposed to what was termed the "bourgeoisie of the old cities."²⁷ This is another indication that the underlying forces still laid outside urban politics; they did not enter them until 1956.

The New Parties

After 1946 a series of political parties emerged: the Senegalese branch of the S.F.I.O., the B.D.S., the M.P.S., and the U.D.S.²⁸ Only the first two received wide support, yet one cannot fail to be impressed by the extent of party membership. Out of a group of 1,200 men interviewed at Dakar, for example, more than half (56 per cent) declared themselves members of a party.²⁹ The percentage was very high, and of considerable significance. The population involved in this sampling was essentially a stable one, or at least one settled in cities for several years. Other researches justify

²⁵ At the time, the civil administration viewed this revolt rather favorably. Of course, it was only one aspect of the politics of the period. Some rather contradictory alliances were formed to oppose the S.F.I.O.

²⁶ Assuming a limited sense for the word "political," by applying it solely to party organizations.

²⁷ Cf. P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56). Materials for comparison appear, *mutatis mutandis*, in E.-F. Frazier, *Bourgeoisie noire*, Paris, 1956.

²⁸ Senegalese Populist Movement and Senegalese Democratic Union.

²⁹ This involved solely the male population.

the assertion that the temporary population, especially the seasonal one, shared very little in urban politics.³⁰ However, the groupings under study clearly extended beyond the nucleus of the "old population," which in Dakar was less sharply defined and more conglomerate than in a center such as St. Louis.³¹ The traits peculiar to the latter were still discernible, however: thus, the majority ethnic group — Lebou and Wolof, which includes the largest number of "old urban families" — exhibited these political characteristics in a more striking form. Exact data gathered on extended family groups revealed political party membership varying from 50 to 80 per cent among the Lebou and Wolof (as much among women as among men); in these cases, membership was verified by possession of a party card. This verification was not required in the course of the general study previously noted; one may thus assume that some of the men interviewed who declared themselves members of a party were only sympathizers, or had failed to have their cards renewed. Other data, however, confirmed the validity of the information obtained. Thus, during the post-war years the Senegal branch of the S.F.I.O. was among the six most important branches of the party; in the mid-1950's the enormous majority of its adherents were to be found in the coastal cities.

One peculiarity, examined in the course of this essay, requires at least a partial interpretation. Considering the massive party membership, participation in elections was scanty. Thus, at the time of the last municipal elections in Dakar, the number of persons registered to vote exceeded 50,000.³² According to the

census of 1955, one might have expected it to reach nearly 80,000. Abstentions — in relation to the number registered — amounted to about 30 per cent. In this trend one can see the ambiguity that typified political life in the Senegalese cities. Evidence was also gathered on the status of participation in the other phases of party activity. Parties are organized in ward sections, sometimes with separate sections for women. The activities of these sections do not merit detailed study; they vary too greatly in intensity. One point became clear, however, from direct observation on one hand and the results of a series of interviews on the other: these sectional activities drew only a very limited portion — about 10 per cent — of party effectives. By contrast, occasional demonstrations might draw considerable numbers, including individuals from outside the city. Sometimes such demonstrations coincided with propaganda meetings organized directly by the party. In other cases they stemmed from the presence of a party leader as an observer at an official reception, a conference, etc.

Other facts also demonstrate that party membership does not imply militant action in the specifically political arena. A series of interviews carried out during 1953-1954 revealed only a slight degree of ideological unity in the two large parties, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S.; knowledge about specific phases of their programs was generally modest or non-existent. Hence distribution of party memberships scarcely involved a precise ideological choice.³³ This choice to some degree reflected an actual distinction,³⁴ but this was apparently no more than a tendency. In addition to the primary

³⁰ But it could remain attached more or less firmly to the political activities of the place of its origin.

³¹ It included elements from St. Louis and Gorée, Lebou elements that had become urbanized "on the spot," etc. The population of Dakar tripled 1936-1956, from 80,000 to nearly 250,000.

³² To be precise, 52,250. These elections are used as an example because the new organization for the city government involved a revision of the electoral lists, the most extensive in many years; and, also, a comparison with recent census figures (compiled in 1955) was possible for the first time.

³³ The facts of the split between the latent ideological content of judgments and opinions of a political sort, and that of the party programs, are noted below. Of course, there were probably distinctions according to level of schooling.

³⁴ Roughly, between old and new city-dwellers.

cause of this peculiarity, described previously, there were secondary causes, of ethnic, religious, and other natures. Their action contributed to the blurring of lines between the party groups. These facts explain, for example, why the B.D.S., until its recent changes, was unable despite great efforts to change the nature of urban politics. Only the broad action of new factors that were felt considerably beyond the frontiers of Senegal, from 1956 on, brought some change.

These widespread occurrences affected chiefly the two large parties. The other parties, the M.P.S. and U.D.S., which had developed from the schism in the R.D.A., had a quite different nature. They were parties of activists, and in Senegalese political life had only secondary importance. The successes of the R.D.A. elsewhere in West Africa, even during 1956-1957, had only feeble repercussions in Senegal. This fact had many causes, which cannot be studied here. By contrast, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S. were tending to become, in terms of number, parties with mass support; their cores were made up as much by "notables" and "elected agents" as by activists. The struggle between these two parties continued to dominate the stage, if not in all Senegal, at least in the cities and in certain rural districts.³⁵ In some cases it took extremely violent forms. Pre-election riots were common between 1946 and 1956. Even in 1957, rather serious incidents marked the reorganization of the commune of Dakar, before the last municipal elections.³⁶ For the first time, elements of the B.D.S. (now the Senegalese Populist Bloc, or B.P.S.) won strong representation in the city council, previously dominated without opposition by the S.F.I.O. (now the African Socialist Movement—M.S.A.); an outburst of partisan passions marked

this shift. Such demonstrations revealed the intense hostility between the two main parties. This deeply influenced urban life, in the realms that overlapped into the specifically political domain.

Some indications have been given as to the significance of party membership. They can be supplemented by approaching the problem somewhat differently. To a considerable degree, the parties remained closely associated with the "clienteles" that typified pre-war political life. This trait appeared most clearly in the party in power, the one that controlled the city government. To maintain and increase such a political clientele, the party had access to very important instruments. Through the numerous municipal employees and all others who depended upon city hall, or who directly or indirectly benefited from its aid or its support, it extended a very wide network of influence. This was elaborated by the other network of influence, comprising the traditionally influential individuals, who were partly interwoven into it.³⁷ If a party had such a basis its dynamic force dropped considerably, and the role of its leaders assumed major importance. The prestige of the leader was essential to the cohesion of the political groups. This fact came out clearly in various researches. For instance, in the course of over 100 interviews it appeared that there were wide gaps between the official orientation of the party to which the respondent belonged and the political goals that he expressed.³⁸ Adherence to the leader overcame that difference to some extent. A certain formalization of partisan attachment thus appeared, in a primitive fashion. The importance of the leader's prestige was revealed with the greatest clarity in relation to the feminine clientele of the parties. It must be emphasized that at Dakar, at least among the

³⁵ Where the rivalry, furthermore, was chiefly between the "outposts," in this case more or less connected with the tradition of the "old cities," and the surrounding countryside.

³⁶ The separation of Gorée and the anticipated electoral redistricting had persuaded the civil administration to dissolve the municipal council and to replace it during the electoral period with a bipartisan municipal commission.

³⁷ Particularly in their activity as electoral agents.

³⁸ In a general way, these goals showed a much more definite "nationalist" potential.

elements that have been urbanized the longest, the percentage of party memberships has been as high among women as among men. This was a peculiar aspect of the Dakar situation, not found, for instance, at Thiès (where the percentage of memberships among women, depending upon the ethnic group, was from one-half to one-tenth that among men). At Dakar the women's branches on occasion could mobilize large crowds, adorned in party colors. Study of about 30 of these individual cases suggested that the conscious essence of political attachment consisted almost entirely of the relation with the leader.

The formalization noted above can be studied from various points of view. The fundamental bipartition of political life in a way was responsible for the indirect expression of intragroup and intergroup divisions and rivalries whose nature was other than political. This explains why the line of separation between the two political blocs did not have the same significance to all sectors of the population. In specific situations it assumed many meanings. For example, one could find: (1) hostility between the Lebou-Wolof grouping and the rest of the population (which resembled, without exactly corresponding to, the fundamental division noted above); (2) hostility, more or less muted, between Wolof and Lebou; and (3) hostilities within each of the two groups, in proportion to diversities of origin, status, etc.

This accounts for the relative flexibility prevailing in the composition of the clienteles that made up the parties.³⁹ Since the clienteles represented varied levels, however, they introduced new divisions, or revived and solidified old hostilities.

(1) A fundamental problem arises from the interactions between the modern political system and what remains of the traditional or semi-traditional sys-

tems. At Dakar, the powers of the "*sérigne*" and of the dignitaries of the former "Lebou Republic" were continued, although they gradually lost their importance.⁴⁰ The parties were careful to keep these leading figures among their clientele. As a result there were some rather complex manipulations concerning nominations and successions. A nomination accepted by one party was more or less openly contested by the other. Hence the relatively frequent bifurcation of power: opposing the dignitary who had received official recognition was another who maintained himself as pretender, with the support of the party that had backed his candidacy. Such events stood out even more sharply among ward leaders, who depended most directly upon the party that controlled the city government. Their support was more or less confined to the voters of this party. Hence certain wards had clandestine ward leaders, around whom the members of the opposition party could gather. Of course, such phenomena have accelerated the deterioration of these institutions.

(2) In the religious field, control over chiefs of the great Moslem brotherhoods similarly has been at stake in intense struggles between the parties. This was particularly true of the main brotherhood in Senegal, that of the Tidjanes. This problem has been centered outside Dakar and the other coastal cities, but has had important repercussions in these cities. The rivalries that apparently have always surrounded the choice of the caliph of the Tidjanes were intensified and acquired a greater impact, in proportion as the fundamental hostility of the parties was openly associated with them. Violent incidents involving political enemies occurred even on pilgrimages to Tivaouane, where the caliph resides; they contributed to the prolongation of conflicts within the caliph's family. Well-meaning interference by re-

³⁹ We found, for example, that extended family groups with some degree of solidarity might be divided in political views. This caused severe tensions, but rarely breaks.

⁴⁰ Cf. C. Michel, *op. cit.* The civil administration continued to grant some prominence to the *sérigne* of Dakar, and ultimately used him as a propaganda agent in some of its activities outside Senegal.

spected figures, with the aim of keeping such matters on a purely religious plane, has had little success. The Tidjane chiefs have been too enmeshed in politics to listen.

(3) A last example involves recreational activities organized at the end of the year around the exhibition of the "lanterns."⁴¹ These activities provided a basis for the formation of temporary groupings founded on ethnic background, neighborhood, occupation, etc. Such groupings undertook the making of a "lantern," and exhibited it to neighbors, relatives and others, eventually by forming a parade. An element of competition entered; the most noteworthy "lanterns" won rather imposing gifts and a brief prestige for the groupings that exhibited them. The parties seized on this competitive aspect. Party sections themselves created "lantern" groupings. With access to considerable material means and a large number of workers, they made "lanterns" that were veritable carnival floats, huge and very elaborate. Their exhibition brought together in a procession the typical rabble of large political demonstrations. At the same time it aroused friction between hostile parties.⁴² They had taken over, almost entirely at their expense, demonstrations whose character they had utterly changed. This is a typical example of the way in which disparate activities have been infused by the two-party rivalry.

This process also has another side: the parties have seen a decline in their opportunities for expressing political drives. In the old cities, they experienced relative stagnation for some years, while social changes accelerated and intensified. Elements just becoming aware of the world

political situation remained aloof from party activity, unless they joined the marginal parties. This was a prime discovery from general investigations at Dakar and St. Louis. Comparison of the principal socio-occupational categories that had been used as a basis for classifying the population under study provided informative data for this topic. The following categories showed a percentage of political party membership higher than that of the average of respondents: farmers and fishermen; unskilled laborers and domestic workers; merchants. By contrast, the percentage of membership was lower among semi-skilled workers, higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, and professional people. It is significant that trained workers and the intellectual elements most often kept apart from the existing political system. Such was the situation at Dakar. That at St. Louis was little different, or so it appeared from an incomplete analysis of an inquiry carried out among a sampling of the population in the island wards.

By contrast, the inquiry carried out at Thiès, whose traits are quite unlike those of the "old cities," provided very different results. For all the men, the percentage of membership was smaller than that at Dakar—40 per cent.⁴³ The following categories were below that figure: farmers, merchants, skilled workers, lower-ranking office-workers, and government employees. On the other hand, unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, were higher.⁴⁴ Here the greatest degree of party membership corresponded to the most active categories; Thiès does not have the political traditions of the old cities, and the formalization found in them was much less

⁴¹ At first these were merely decorated lanterns. The custom certainly has a European origin; it is typical of the "old cities" of Senegal.

⁴² In 1954 the parades of "lanterns" were prohibited by administrative edict.

⁴³ The results at Dakar and at Thiès cannot be compared in detail. However, the informative value of these general results could, in each case, be verified at other stages in the research.

⁴⁴ It should be noted that in the case of Thiès the category of unskilled workers was much closer to that of semi-skilled workers. The unskilled workers, largely employed by the railroad, comprise a more stable group than at Dakar.

striking. The data from Thiès enable one to approach in a much more meaningful way the problem of differentiating between the two large Senegalese parties in terms of their socio-occupational composition. Adherence to the B.D.S. was generally predominant in all categories, but the trend toward this party was greater, on the one hand, among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and on the other, among higher-ranking office-workers and government employees. At Dakar, where the B.D.S. was at this time in the minority, a comparable trend was apparent: the party was proportionately stronger among semi-skilled workers and intellectuals. But differentiations of this type cannot fail to be blurred in a context such as that described above.

Therefore the importance of the groups remaining on the edge of party activities was more significant. Two groups merit particular attention. These were, first, the new cadres emerging from higher education; the problems resulting from their emergence are briefly discussed below. Secondly, there was a rather large group of persons less than thirty years old who had at least a primary school education.⁴⁵ The criticisms that the latter expressed against the established political system were often very harsh (against the city government, against the cadres of the two parties, etc.). Some had made several attempts to gain admittance to the existing parties, or into youth groups affiliated with the parties. They found themselves in weakly-structured, short-lived groups with no specific political function, but in which political problems were approached in a generally non-conformist manner. Otherwise they devoted their energies to organized non-political groupings.

The importance of some of these non-political groupings must now be examined. To a large degree they offered, more

than the relatively inflexible political parties, adequate frameworks for expressing anti-colonial demands and for creating activists.

Religious Organizations

As distinct from many other parts of Sub-Sahara Africa, organizations of a religious character play only a very limited part here. We have already seen how the "traditional" political parties entered into the activities of some religious groups and attempted to make them recruiting bases for their clientele. The more limited movements alone provided certain means, chiefly indirect, for expressing extremist political demands. This was the case, for example, of a grouping founded by Mo'lem students at Dakar. However, they received very little support.⁴⁶

Cultural Associations and Youth Movements

Cultural associations and youth movements have had a more important role in this area. Some of them have contributed to the formation of strong political cadres. In general, the cultural associations have had a rather precarious existence; their activities in some cases have ceased. Their efforts to win the support of the masses by undertaking an educational role — for instance, by means of the theater — have often been disappointing. Finally, they often have had a ambiguous nature. Thus, in a city such as Dakar, founded by highly "assimilated" elements, they have experienced some difficulty in contributing to the development of modernized African culture. But they are not devoid of concern for political organization in a very general sense, removed from party orientation. This was shown with regard to three of the

⁴⁵ Often, youths whose studies had been interrupted. It was difficult for them to achieve occupational stability.

⁴⁶ Its policies called for a renovation of Islam, so that it came more or less directly into opposition with the great Brotherhoods, whose religious formalism was rather marked; the latter retained a generally dominant influence.

most vigorous associations, by an investigation of the topics discussed by the study groups that they created, and of the content of the discussion.⁴⁷ By considering such questions as teaching and the language for teaching, the organization of local communities, economic development, interracial marriages, etc., their study of the political problems resulting from the colonial situation had wide influence.

As for the Youth Council of Senegal, which comprised the majority of youth associations and was organized primarily in the cities, the orientation of its activity was even clearer. By the nature of its conflicts with the civil administration, by the content of its demands in behalf of youth, by the topics related to the future of youth whose study it was undertaking, it disclosed a "nationalist" potential of some vigor.

It is essential to note the possible role of associations founded on ethnic or territorial bases, in particular those inspired by youths. Centers for contact with territories other than Senegal, they spread the foreign political influence of the parties predominating within them. This seemed to be the case, for instance, of the grouping of Senegalese youths with relation to the R.D.A. However, these associations were never directly linked with a given partisan organization. The political role that they might temporarily play was very flexible and therefore somewhat indeterminate.

Labor Unions

Labor unions should receive especial attention. The union movement in French West Africa is numerically one of the most important, and among the most active, in all of sub-Sahara Africa. Like the political parties, it took form only in the immediate post-war period.

In 1954 it had a membership about 100,000, or a little less than one-third of all wage-earners. The unions have reached their greatest development in Senegal, especially in the large cities. In 1954 this territory contained more than half the union members in French West Africa, more than a third of all Senegalese wage-earners. Dakar has a central role in this field. It is the headquarters for the largest unions, which were once affiliated with French federations but are now autonomous. Dakar also possesses a very active "Labor Exchange." By itself it contains more than two-fifths of the union members in Senegal.

To some extent the significance of the unions is more than occupational and economic. The degree to which they complete the political machinery of the city is suggested by a comparison of the percentages of party memberships with the percentages of union memberships. Of 1,200 persons interrogated during the Dakar survey noted above, about one-half (52 per cent) stated they were union members. The potential ambiguity of such statements was suggested above in connection with political parties.⁴⁸ However, an analysis of the respondents by socio-occupational categories gave meaningful results. The average rate of union membership was surpassed by lower-ranking office-workers and government employees, higher-ranking office-workers and government employees, and professional people; it was equalled by semi-skilled workers. With the exception of the first, these are precisely the categories whose rates of party membership were lowest. On the other hand, participation in union activity was distinctly more important among the categories comprising the intellectual elements than

⁴⁷ We acknowledge our indebtedness to the cultural associations for inviting us to participate in their study groups.

⁴⁸ Respondents claiming membership in a union often were behind in the payment of their dues, or only heeded the directives of the union without having joined it. Hence the number of union members, so far as it can be estimated from the general survey, is much higher than that given by the unions themselves. The deviations shown for the different categories are more marked than the raw figures of the general survey indicate; the categories with the highest percentages of union members were those in which the exactness of the responses was the greatest, as later samplings emphasized.

among the semi-skilled workers. The situation was reversed at Thiès, but because of the large Dakar-Niger Railroad shops there, this city is an exceptional case. The traits found at Dakar, by contrast, proved characteristic of unionism in French West Africa. The overall figures, obtained from official sources based on statements by unions, indicated clearly that manual occupations were the least unionized. Out of the 100,000 union members in French West Africa in 1954, more than half were either government officials or government employees. The rate of unionization in the governmental sector was nearly double that in the non-governmental sector. Finally, in the two sectors together, semi-skilled workers comprised only a little more than a fourth of all union members. Furthermore, results of the studies at Dakar and Thiès suggest that union membership and level of schooling correlate rather closely; this was far from the case with respect to party membership, at least at Dakar. To what degree did unionism offer educated individuals a means of expression that, in the period studied, parties did not offer them? Educated persons, especially youths, were more susceptible to extremist anti-colonial aspirations. And to what degree could union action present itself more clearly as a trial postponement for the existing order than action within the framework of parties?

The particular traits of union struggle markedly demonstrate the fundamental conflicts of the colonial situation. One cannot accurately speak of the "politicization" of unions, in the sense many government officials give this term. The limited activities of parties and the very conditions of unionism in a colonial situation have given unionism a marked political coloring.

(1) Interviews of militant unionists,

⁴⁰ This struggle against the civil administration was not confined to local matters. It was affected by events at Paris, both administrative and parliamentary. The use of political precedents seems very clear here. They sometimes brought success, as was the case in the enforcement of the provisions of the Labor Code regarding the hours of work.

focussing on some of their asserted policies, revealed that the union struggle was regarded as directed essentially against the government. This must be interpreted not only with regard to the general traits of the colonial system but also in relation to the commanding role that the government played in labor. It was first of all the principal employer: in a city such as Dakar, a little more than a third of the wage-earners were dependent upon it. It was responsible for setting the minimum wage, and it has happened that owing to budgetary considerations and general policy it established a lower figure than non-governmental employers might have adopted. Finally, during the period in question, a central problem was that of enforcing the Code of Overseas Labor, enacted by Parliament in 1952. The civil administration was responsible for its enforcement, and the strikes of 1953 were designed to bring pressure on the administration so as to obtain a "fair enforcement" of its provisions. In the interviews mentioned above, conflicts with employers were scarcely mentioned as such. Employers were identified with the civil administration; the terms "civil administration" and "colonialism" seemed almost interchangeable. The adversary of the unions being essentially the civil administration — and a "colonial civil administration" — their action inevitably assumed political significance, broadly defined.⁴⁰

(2) In the field of union activities the hostility between the European component and the African component of the urban population showed itself most vividly. This stemmed not merely from the fact that the civil administration and the employers represented the power of the "whites." It was also noteworthy that European workers, employees, and officials almost invariably formed separate unions, with goals sharply opposed to

those of the African unions.⁵⁰ The acute crises produced by certain important strikes gave forceful expression to this rift. The African unions, despite their ideological differences, despite the personal rivalries that brought their leaders into opposition, often engaged in combined and coordinated activities. By contrast, the strikes of the African workers and those of the European workers scarcely ever coincided, though the latter might break out as a response to the former in an effort to maintain the hierarchy of salary scales. As demonstrations of African unity against the civil administration and against European controls in general, strikes were the only occasion in which the underlying tension characterizing the city appeared distinctly and in a generalized fashion. It was because they expressed this tension that their impact and the emotional response to them were so important.

(3) This was also the principal cause of their ultimate success. During such conflicts, demands were expressed that were far more extreme than those made by the parties. Thus, in the strikes of 1953, the union press and the union leaders evoked the possibility that African "loyalism" would be suspended and that the bonds between France and the Overseas Territories would be changed; the question of independence was openly and threateningly discussed. Union activities assumed a certain nationalistic coloring that the parties at that time disregarded. Behind every limited demand regarding salaries or the regulation of working conditions lay the fundamental anti-colonial demand; it was this demand that gave weight to the mass demonstrations and that carried the day.⁵¹ It must be further noted that during this period major external ideological elements entered the contest, especially through the unions. An important number of their activists had studied techniques of organization,

both in France and in other countries. Participation in international congresses put them in contact with the ideological currents of the world. A study of the union press was very revealing in this regard.

To the masses, unions proposed goals that were, in the period under consideration, far different from those of the political parties. Unions were in many ways more systematic and more vigorous. They were much less apt to make differentiations along ethnic, religious, or other lines. The unity of action that they practiced banned their assimilating such hostilities and conflicts, whose meaning was foreign to them. These hostilities yielded before the fundamental hostility brought out by union action. The near-unanimity with which the directives of the union have been followed is very significant. For the elites, on the other hand, unions offered, in an era in which the forms and matrices of customary political expression appeared too narrow, a wider and more adequate field of action. Unionism supplied the most accessible agencies for sharing in power of the modern sort. The intellectual elites furnished the substance of the union framework and played a dominant role on their executive committees.⁵² Located at the very center of situations of tension and conflict, they found in union activities the most effective way of asserting modern views and of surmounting the limits barring their advancement in the political and occupational fields.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1956

Such were the chief aspects, in a period of transition, of the political life of the large Senegalese urban centers. In the subsequent four years, great changes have occurred. Senegalese political individuality — considerably modified by that of the "old cities" — has remained clear, but it has in great part shifted to

⁵⁰ Cf. P. Mercier, "Aspects des problèmes de stratification sociale," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.* XVIII, 1954.

⁵¹ A scrutiny of union publications in 1953 made this evident.

⁵² In a very broad sense; their composition was very heterogeneous and drawn from various strata.

other fields.

In the "old cities," changes have taken place that were already evident when the investigations noted above were being conducted. The importance of these facts must be emphasized:

(1) The separation between the cities and the countryside, and more particularly between the old cities and the rest of the territory, is becoming less sharp. This fact has already been pointed out in connection with recent demographic developments and the growth of the B.D.S. There are other indications. The intellectual elites have more diversified origins; though the oldest nuclei of urban population remain important in their composition, they are steadily decreasing in size. The bonds among the different sections of the territory are tightening. On the other hand, the old elites are becoming active outside city boundaries, and give a place in their considerations to the problems of rural modernization and evolution. Certain projects established by the youth associations and the unions have contributed to this orientation.

(2) These facts are connected with a shift in generations that has extensive effects. The attitude of youthful elites has been different; they feel themselves competent to assume broader responsibilities.⁵³ At the same time they are diverging more or less impetuously from the paths of "assimilation," and are striving to rediscover and revive specifically African values. An effort to prove themselves individually by integrating themselves into the existing system is being succeeded by an effort to prove themselves as representatives and guides for a host that must be freed from this system. This is a trend toward nationalism, in the widest sense of the term.

(3) In the coastal cities, the growing strength of racial tensions since the last war cannot fail to encourage such a

change. The vast increase in the number of Europeans, their greater occupational diversification, the much stronger reaction to the facts of discrimination, and multiplication of competitive situations — occupational or otherwise — are the most obvious phases of this major phenomenon.⁵⁴

As these factors have come into full operation, a new phase of political life has opened. These are its principal traits:

(1) From 1956 on, in unions and in politics, secessions from the original French bodies — confederations or parties — have multiplied. Previous remarks indicated the development of this process among unions. After some delay it affected the S.F.I.O. itself, which was transformed, not without difficulties, into the African Socialist Movement. The assimilationist tradition declined, or at least was no longer proclaimed openly. After the parties became autonomous, the distinction between direct and indirect forms of political expression began to disappear. Extremist demands of a nationalistic character found expression within the parties, and worked effectively there after 1957 (at the time when the new "organic law" authorized the first Senegalese government).

(2) To a certain degree, the very old Senegalese political tradition once more became a driving force. At the same time the marginal elements, whose existence was particularly marked among intellectuals, entered into real politics, chiefly within the framework of the B.D.S. They comprised the left wing of the new Senegalese Populist Bloc (B.P.S.), which stemmed from the B.D.S., and shared in the creation of the African Convention, which is striving to extend outside Senegal the strictly autonomous orientations of the B.D.S. They tried to organize the B.D.S. as a

⁵³ Cf. P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).

⁵⁴ Cf. P. Mercier, "Le groupement européen de Dakar," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.*, XIX, 1955.

mass-party, but in patterns very different from those prevailing in the "old cities." Finally, their influence has been decisive in attempts to regroup the Senegalese parties, "disregarding personal and doctrinal differences." It has been a question of wiping out the fundamental hostility that typified post-war Senegalese political life, which — as we have seen — had more than a purely political significance. This effort led, not without difficulties, to the creation of the African Regroupment Party (P.R.A.). The former rivalries were still evident, though in a diminished and less forceful manner, during 1958-1959. The youthful elements of the B.P.S. at first helped provide the latter with leadership of the other territorial parties. It was they who, at the Congress of Cotonou, introduced the first outspoken assertion by the P.R.A. in favor of independence.⁵⁵

(3) However, the influence of the political tradition of the old cities has not been entirely discarded. Added to that of the conservative religious leaders, it helps account for a return to a moderate stand on the part of Senegal. The campaign for the referendum of 1958 showed

this clearly; it was under this two-fold pressure that the B.P.S. took a position in favor of "yes." It likewise accounts for the less extreme attitudes often taken by leaders within the new Mali Federation.⁵⁶ However, this influence of tradition is not sufficient to block new trends. It is significant that in the legislative elections of March, 1959, the Senegalese Solidarity Party (P.S.S.), a combination of conservative city and rural elements, was as thoroughly defeated at St. Louis, where victory seemed probable, as in the rural districts. Again, it should be noted that the youthful elements that entered the B.P.S. in 1956 have in part left the new Senegalese Progressive Union (U.P.S.), an offshoot of the latter party after the regrouping noted above. By founding the African-Senegalese Regroupment Party (P.R.A.-S.), they have hoped to express their disappointment with a party insufficiently radical, insufficiently organized in structure, and containing too many aspects of the "traditional" political life of the old cities.

Paul Mercier

École pratique des Hautes Études

⁵⁵ Some months before there was established an African Independence Party, whose support remains very limited. [Cotonou is the capital of Dahomey.]

⁵⁶ Translator's note: the Mali Federation is the new state formed by the union of Senegal with the Sudanese Republic.

IN THE NEWS

continued from p. 2

RESEARCH: NSF has released prelim. study of research and development (R&D) funds in colleges and universities in '58. Total separately budgeted R&D funds were c. \$736 million, half for basic research, two-thirds from natl. govt. Soc. sci. sector was \$35.6 million, 57% for basic research, 48% from natl. govt. * * * NSF itself made basic research grants of \$49.1 million in '59 (appropriations were \$136 million); its *Office of Soc. Sci.* made a modest 53 grants, \$889.3M in all, in archaeology, econ., phil. of sci., social anthro., demography, hist. of sci., and social psych. * * * *Total R&D expenditures in the U.S. now approach \$13 billion annually; notably, they have exceeded total advertising expenditures since '58 (R&D \$10.23 billion, ads \$10.20 billion).*

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: As of 3/60, 25 educational institutions had refused natl. student loan funds because of non-Communist affidavit requirement, 57 others had officially protested. Kennedy-Clark bill against disclaimer was introduced in Senate, 8 similar bills in House.

Turkey's Path of Development

This interpretation of the economic and political development of modern Turkey is asserted to be an answer to a "letter to the editor" from one Comrade V. I. Smoliakov, who wrote: "It is a well-known fact that after having rid herself from the rule of imperialists in the 1920's, Turkey followed an independent foreign policy and became a champion of peace and anti-colonialism. Why has Turkey recently become the bulwark of imperialism in the Near East?" Two unusual interpretive elements are present: the positive evaluation of Kemal Ataturk's role, and, more striking, a view of present-day Turkey as retrogressive.

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The historical development of modern Turkey abounds in contradictions. This country was first in the Near East to embark upon a road of national independence and national sovereignty, yet today she is one of the most important agents of colonialism in the area. Her national bourgeoisie, once in the forefront of the liberation movement, now supports a professedly anti-national policy. Ankara, the "second Mecca" of the Islamic peoples during the years of the war of national liberation, has become a refuge for those puppets of imperialism who had to flee from the revenge of their own peoples.

There have been momentous changes in Soviet-Turkish relations. In November, 1920, Kemal Ataturk expressed "the profound enthusiasm of the Turkish people for the Soviet people, who are not content with shaking off their own chains . . . but are resolved to crush oppression all over the world." As late as 1936, Kemal said: "Our friendship to the USSR is as strong and sincere as it was fifteen years ago." Nevertheless, the present rulers of Turkey support the enemies of the Soviet Union, prevent the restoration of friendly relations between the two countries, and subordinate the political, economic, financial, and territorial interests of the Turkish people to the will of aggressive American cliques.

This conspicuous turn of events, however, is neither surprising nor unexpected, for the forces of reaction have been pres-

ent ever since the successful War of Independence. Even in the earliest stages of its development, the Turkish national bourgeoisie was characterized by a dichotomy of progressive and reactionary tendencies, and the popular masses were not sufficiently prepared to counteract the working of reactionary forces and to determine the course of democratic transformation. The progressive forces of international politics were much weaker than today, while at the same time the position of imperialism was strong enough to accelerate the development of reactionary tendencies among the leading groups of Young Turks.

The Turkish bourgeois-nationalist revolution was progressive because it was waged against the allies of imperialism, against feudal-clericalism, and against colonialism. But while the national bourgeoisie raised the standard of independence the same class also endeavored to secure special privileges and the domination of the new state; its nationalism very soon turned into extreme chauvinism and stern measures were taken against socialists and the national minorities, against the demands of the workers and peasants, and against the democratization of the social order.

The two tendencies existed side by side and worked through the same historical forces, but the relationship of the two was dependent on various internal and external political factors. There is no doubt that had the progressive tendencies

survived longer, the new international situation characterized by the progressive forces of socialism would have given a different turn to events in Turkey. But the development of a bourgeois-nationalist Turkish state, the growing strength of bourgeois-nationalist tendencies, and the inconsistency of foreign policy were largely inevitable concomitants of the development of a capitalist economy.

The situation is quite different in countries that have gained their independence in the recent period of victorious socialism and decadent imperialism. Obviously, class differences and contradictions are present between the working masses, who demand solutions for important social problems, and their rulers, who try to utilize their privileged position in order to gain further material and political advantages. As Comrade N. S. Khrushchev pointed out at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, "political processes in former colonial countries do not reflect differences among political parties but the contradictions of class societies." Reactionary tendencies may be even more acute in such countries because of the influence of imperialism. The role of progressive forces is the same as it was in Turkey, but the international situation is fundamentally different from what it was 20 or 30 years ago. Therefore it is safe to say that the "Turkish case" cannot be regarded as typical.

The cruel and humiliating armistice of Mudros (October, 1918) that Turkey had to accept aboard H.M.S. Agamemnon left the country in a desperately defenseless situation. The Entente powers envisaged the cession of Izmir and East Thrace, the establishment of international supervision over a part of Anatolia and the strait zone, financial controls, full disarmament, and the appointment of international "advisors" to various leading positions. Although these conditions were all but identical with colonialism, the Sultan and the ruling classes accepted and fulfilled them with utmost servility. Some representatives of the bourgeoisie could see no way out but to seek the

suzerainty of an imperialist power or to have Turkey made a mandate territory under U.S. supervision. Popular resistance against such plans was widespread in Anatolia, and a small group of the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of General Mustafa Kemal took command of the popular movement. In retaliation, the imperialists occupied Istanbul, forced the Sultan to sign the "peace" treaty of Sèvres, and organized Greek military intervention to suppress the seemingly unimportant revolt in Anatolia.

At this juncture Turkey embarked upon the only correct road, that of revolutionary war against foreign interventionists and the reactionary Sultanate. The country itself was backward and desperately poor, it had no proletariat to lead the revolutionary movement, and the national bourgeoisie often showed remarkable indecision. Nonetheless, the revolutionary movement succeeded in freeing the country from foreign oppression. The victory of the progressive forces, however, would not have been possible had it not been for certain external factors. First, one must recall the victory of the Socialist Revolution in the Soviet Union and the direct assistance provided the Turkish people by the Soviet Government. The forces of imperialism were defeated by the general revolutionary upsurge in the countries of East and West, the sympathy of Islamic peoples all over the world, especially in India, and the pressure of progressive opinion in the Western countries, in addition to the determined resistance of the Turkish people. As V. I. Lenin said: "Turkey was doomed to be the prey of imperialism... but the people resisted and forced the greatest imperialist powers to take their hands off."

The end of the war of liberation did not mean the end of all difficulties. The long series of wars had devastated the country and ruthless exploitation of its resources by feudal lords and foreign capitalists had crippled economic life. The new nationalist leadership was undoubtedly more progressive than the

feudal Sultanate, but it still represented the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landowning class. Accordingly, despite the outstanding role of Communists in the national war of liberation, the new government took repressive measures against the Communist movement, which had serious effects on the further development of the country. "Fighting against Communism and other progressive forces must necessarily be reactionary," said N. S. Khrushchev. "An anti-Communist policy does not unite a nation. On the contrary, it divides popular forces and weakens determination to resist imperialism." Even before the end of the revolutionary war, the nationalists turned against the young and still nascent workers' and peasants' organizations; mass arrests and executions of Communist leaders very shortly forced the Party underground. But because in addition to political power the bourgeoisie wanted all the economic gains of the war of liberation, Turkish foreign policy retained much of its anti-imperialistic character.

The republic of the national bourgeoisie was built on the ruins of the semi-colonial, clerical-feudal Ottoman Empire. The 1920's and '30's witnessed the large-scale reorganization of administration and the judiciary, the legal system, and education. Great changes were brought about in religious and cultural life. The feudal aristocracy, the bureaucracy of the Sultanate, and religious leaders lost their political influence. The influence of foreign capital was diminished, first by the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which curtailed the legal rights of foreign concessionaires and creditors. Attempts were made to eliminate foreign capital from the national economy altogether by repurchasing a number of foreign concessions (railways, ports, mines, public utilities) or by terminating contracts and placing them under strict state control.

Turkish politics of the period was characterized by strong statism and by tendencies to encourage national capitalism by the state. The young and weak

national economy had to be protected from the strong expansionism of Western capitalist economies. But neither protectionism nor legislation (e.g., the 1927 Act of Industrial Development) produced significant changes in the rate of capital investment. Merchants and financiers were reluctant to invest their capital in industry, preferring the commercial and banking operations that provided them with a greater profit rate and capital turnover. After the failure of this policy of encouragement, the government took direct initiative and control over industrial expansion.

The opposition of feudal parties and groupings to state capitalism was great. These elements advocated a *rapprochement* with the West, advocating the industrialization of the country by the use of imported capital instead of internal economic resources. It is important to note that the Turkish government of the day sought the cooperation of the USSR instead of the West. In 1932 the Soviet Union provided an interest-free loan of \$8,000,000 for the purchase of heavy industrial machinery. The Soviet Union also provided technical assistance for industrial construction and a number of qualified mechanics for the installation of equipment. Thus the Soviet Union not only supported the Turkish people during their struggle against imperialism, but selflessly continued to support them in the achievement of economic independence. But the importance of this loan was far greater than the immediate economic gains. Soviet assistance had a great moral effect on the broadest strata of Turkish society and greatly influenced the attitude of Western financial interests, who until then had kept the country under a financial blockade. As an effect of the Soviet loan, Turkey succeeded in obtaining credit from Western countries on non-political terms.

With the help of Soviet financial assistance, huge textile plants were built in Kizer and Nazilli. The state sector was considerably expanded, with the bulk of investment going into industries previ-

ously non-existent in Turkey, such as sugar, cement, paper, glass, wood pulp, etc. The aggregate value of industrial production amounted to 58 million liras in 1927; by 1939 it had increased to 331 million liras (counting the production of factories with over 10 workers if mechanized, or over 20 workers if not mechanized). New railway lines, the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic, and several commercial banks were financed by state funds. The state investment program and the re-purchase of concessions strengthened state capitalism and improved the foreign trade and payment balance of the country. Government policy thus was aimed at strengthening national independence while serving the interests of the broad popular masses as well. The foreign policy of the country restored Turkish prestige in international relations and strengthened the friendship of the Turkish people with the USSR.

The Turkish government, however, left the path of positive nationalist policy in the second half of the 1930's. By this time the Anatolian (nationalist) bourgeoisie had been assimilated into the Istanbul (comprador*) bourgeoisie, and this powerful new class fell under the leadership of commercial-industrial comprador elements. The activities of the leading cliques were increasingly characterized by the pursuit of narrow class interests. The policy of state capitalism was not immediately abandoned, but the share of private capital gradually and visibly increased. In a later phase, the rate of private investment surpassed that of public investment; the comprador circles clearly favored the expansion of Western financial capitalism. Their influence put a brake on the progressive reformism of the government; the cultural and educational programs in particular were seriously curtailed or dispensed with as dangerous. Simultaneously, the policy of national independence and pro-Soviet orientation was abandoned, although this

program had enjoyed the unqualified support of all political parties. When the Liberal Party was founded in 1930, the Istanbul newspaper *Milliet* editorialized: "Our foreign policy has a positive national character. It is the duty of each political party to honor the guiding principles of this foreign policy. One of these principles is our friendship with the Soviet Union. Every well-meaning Turkish citizen attaches great importance to these friendly relations."

The new foreign policy became evident with the "gentleman's agreement" of 1935 with Britain, which made Turkey a chain in the system of Mediterranean alliances. In 1936, at the conference of Montreux, Turkey was already on the side of British imperialism and opposed to the interests of the Soviet Union. She also supported Franco-British imperialism on the question of strategic straits, followed a policy of "non-interference" during the Spanish Civil War, joined the Balkans Entente (Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania), and later joined the Near Eastern Alliance (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan).

It is generally acknowledged that the foreign policy of states is dependent upon their domestic policies. This is, however, not the case with weak states such as Turkey, where political decisions are made under the pressure of foreign powers. In such cases, changes in the course of foreign policy will bring about decisive changes in internal, social relations.

Kemal's death in 1938 was of decisive importance too. We certainly must recognize that the role of the individual is limited by his environment and by historical and social conditions; hence Kemal cannot be held solely responsible for the developments. Obviously his policy was class policy, but his judgment, foresight, and sincere patriotism at least served to restrain reactionary tendencies. Kemal could not have prevented the new political orientation of Turkey but he could have saved his country from major

* This term refers to the indigenous bourgeoisie who benefit materially and politically from a colonial regime.

political deviations and national catastrophes. After his death, however, reactionary forces were revitalized and the leaders of the feudal-comprador parties received high parliamentary and state positions. Kemal's successors usurped his name but had nothing in common with his policies.

During World War II the Turkish government revealed its true face. Its sole aim was to strengthen the dictatorship in order to increase the profits of the bourgeois and landowning classes. Although Turkey was a non-belligerent (she did not declare war on Germany and Japan until February, 1945) the ruling class maintained a disproportionately large army, the burden of which rested on the working people. The cost of living increased between four and five times during the war years, and in Istanbul alone there were 55,000 registered paupers. The twelve-hour working day was introduced by law but it was not uncommon for workers to work 14 to 16 hours. Income taxes on wages amounted to no less than 32 per cent, and in the villages the *asar* (feudal tithe) system was revived. No one knows exactly how much the ruling classes profited by such methods; the 200 per cent increase of banking accounts and the official statements on speculation and corruption give only a vague idea of their enrichment. In 1943, Ismet Inonu, Kemal's successor and the President of the Republican Party, raised his voice against "the usurers of olden times, the gamblers and speculators, who draw their profit from difficult conditions." But in fact the government did nothing to stem the tide of corruption. After the war, in 1945, deputy Hikmet Bajur declared in the *Medjlis*: "Speculation, bribery, and fraudulent practices have become an everyday feature of our economic life, but, except for a few speeches, no measures have been taken against them. Both town and village are at the mercy of these plunderers, and the government is unable to intervene."

As has already been mentioned, Turkish

foreign policy before the war was strongly oriented toward the Anglo-French imperialistic bloc. Later, when France was defeated and Hitler attacked the USSR, this orientation was changed in favor of Nazi Germany and its allies. Disregarding her declaration of neutrality and previous conventions with the USSR (friendship and non-aggression) and England (mutual assistance), as well as her obligations arising out of the international convention on the strategic straits, Turkey provided the Axis with important war materials and showed willingness to enter the war on the side of Germany. When the defeat of Germany became evident, Turkey again turned to England, and to the U.S., Great Britain's successor in Mediterranean power politics. However, despite all these shifts during the war, Turkish foreign policy was consistent in one respect — its hostility toward the Soviet Union.

The strained internal situation immediately after the war forced the ruling circles of Turkey to introduce a number of ostensibly democratic reforms. An agrarian reform was carried out and the organization of political parties was permitted (with the exception of the Communist Party). A new direct electoral system was introduced and wartime emergency decrees were suspended. These reforms, however, were too late to change social conditions decisively. The course of development today is determined by the country's increased dependence on the imperialist powers.

The agrarian reform covered some 1,500,000 hectares of arable land and 800,000 hectares of pastures from state-owned and village community lands. These largely barren lands were distributed among 300,000 peasant families. Great landholdings were not expropriated, although there still remain 2,000,000 smallholders and landless laborers; the agrarian reform thus presented no solution to the land problem.

Parallel to the capitalistic development of Turkish agriculture, there is a return to pre-capitalist forms of exploitation of

primitive peasant farms. Since industrial growth shows signs of stagnation, communications and construction are on the decline. Bankrupt peasant farmers must stay in their villages as seasonal laborers or increase the army of unemployed in the cities. As a result of uneven industrial development the country suffers from conspicuous shortages of consumer goods. Industrial growth did not bring about an expansion of the purchasing power of the masses because all increase in production was channeled into armament programs.

The postwar political and social "democratization" did not create any thoroughgoing changes. The abolition of the one-party system enabled only bourgeois landowner groups to organize opposition political parties. The most important of these was the Democratic Party, which, after the Republican Party lost its authoritarian position, won the elections of 1950.

To date, the Democratic Party is still in power, but it owes its 1957 victory merely to the electoral system. The two leading parties differ from each other only slightly. The other small opposition parties also represent the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Thus all permitted political parties are hostile to the aspirations of the large popular masses. Truly democratic parties have been prosecuted from the very moment of their appearance.

American imperialism capitalized on the alarm of the Turkish bourgeoisie at the democratic and revolutionary movements in the Balkans, Iran, and the Arab countries. The ruling cliques transformed the country into a militarily strategic base of anti-Soviet and colonialist policies in the Middle East and forced the country into the system of aggressive alliances headed by the United States. In 1952 Turkey joined NATO, in 1955 the Baghdad Pact. Adherence to these alliances first meant the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the USSR and the people's democracies, as well as with the countries of the Arab Middle East. This isolation

of Turkey from her neighbors further increased her dependence on the imperialist powers.

The assistance that Turkey receives is military and economic. She has received \$2.1 billion for military purposes and \$1 billion in economic aid during the last ten years. In summer, 1958, a new "stabilization loan" of \$359 million was issued for Turkey. The total, \$3.5 billion, is an exorbitant sum by Turkish standards, and had it been used for productive purposes it would have changed the economic life of Turkey radically.

The dollars and goods that Turkey receives for military purposes cannot be called aid in any sense. These must be used to maintain an army that for all practical purposes is controlled by and subordinate to the U.S. Here, the Americans profit both politically and financially. The standard of living in Turkey is extremely low, much lower than in the U.S. Recently the *Journal of Commerce*, an organ of American monopolist and financial circles, praised the inexpensiveness of the Turkish in comparison to the American soldier. But the above-mentioned \$2.1 billion are only a part of NATO's expenditures in Turkey. During the same period, 1947-57, Turkey spent 12 billion liras (\$4.3 billion). In other words, every American dollar costs the Turks \$2.50 from their own resources.

The second kind of American assistance, economic aid, is a scarcely disguised form of military expenditure. It has been repeatedly admitted that Turkey enjoys economic aid only because she has assumed responsibilities as a military ally of the U.S. A few years ago Turkey applied for an industrial development loan of \$300 million. For years the Turks had been unsuccessful in getting financial assistance for peaceful purposes. Their disappointment was aired in one of the speeches of Premier Menderes (August, 1952) who said that "the refusal to grant Turkey a loan is part of a plan to slow down her economic development, promote the interests of foreign business circles, and thereby increase the depend-

ence of Turkey on foreign countries." When in 1958 the ruling circles of the U.S. decided to grant a "stabilization loan," Turkey had no choice but to accept it at the expense of serious economic restrictions. This loan was granted because of the crisis of American colonialist policies in the Middle East.

Generally speaking, American economic and military aid has had a disastrous effect on Turkish economic life. This assistance benefits only the upper segment of the ruling class, endangering at the same time the very existence of the nation. In August, 1958, government leaders declared in the *Medjlis* that the "stabilization loan was one of the great successes of Turkish foreign policy." Hearing this, the opposition leader Ismet Inonu exclaimed: "Another success of this kind and we cease to exist as a nation."

Before contracting the "stabilization loan" Turkey had an outstanding foreign debt of \$1 billion. Repayment of these loans was to be completed by the year 2002, provided her negative foreign trade balance could be liquidated and the general economic situation stabilized. But this "stabilization loan" only increased Turkey's indebtedness. One really wonders whether the Turkish government or its creditors have any illusions about repayment.

Turkey certainly cannot expect her salvation from imperialist loans. The present situation is highly reminiscent of the events a hundred years ago, when the Sultan first resorted to Western financial aid. In 1854 these loans began with a modest 75 million francs; they rapidly increased, so that by 1874 the country had a foreign debt of 5.3 billion francs (although the French actually paid only 3 billion francs). In 1875 the feudal state went bankrupt, paving the way for the ill-famed "Decree of Mucharrem," which introduced the era of foreign tutelage.

The serious consequences of this policy of foreign loans are already apparent. The budget of 1959 showed a deficit of 1.8 billion lira — the highest figure in

the postwar period. In 1930 the amount of money in circulation was 158.8 million lira, which increased to 881 millions by the end of the war and to 3,827.2 millions by August, 1958. At the same time, the rate of growth in industrial production did not keep pace with the growing amount of money in circulation. The official dollar exchange rate was put at 2.8 lira after the financial reform of 1946, but this rate later deteriorated on the free market to 3.6:1 (1953), 11:2 (1955), and 14:1 (1957). The cost of living increased nine times between 1938 and 1957, but the price of beans increased 40 times, the price of wool 10 times.

At the same time American and other imperialists expand their privileges in the country. Not all details of the terms of the "stabilization loan" are yet available but the supervisory powers of the creditors and the restrictions imposed on industrial investments give certain clues. But the Turkish people are most sensitive and other international missions who are about the privileged status of American and other international missions that are in the country to administer "foreign aid" and NATO military relations. These various missions are exempted from Turkish jurisdiction and enjoy extraterritorial privileges. An American military court and military police are maintained in the country, and American officials receive their salaries at a special rate of exchange. They operate special shops and clubs from which Turkish citizens are excluded.

These are the results of the policy of Western assistance and the logical conclusion of a series of events that started with the first deviations from the policy of national independence. At present the country has been militarized, tax burdens and the cost of living have increased exorbitantly, and, in consequence, the disparity between rich and poor has become greater than ever. As a result of the anti-national policy of the government, almost all of Turkey's neighbors have ceased to maintain friendly relations with her.

The Turkish masses do everything possible to find a way out of this impasse, but it is difficult to voice anti-imperialistic opinions since the press is largely controlled by pro-American imperialistic bourgeois cliques. Recently, however, contrary to previous practices, the parliamentary opposition published sharp criticisms of the government's foreign policy in their press organ, *Ulus*. In August, 1958, when the Menderes government wanted to participate in military intervention against Lebanon and advocated aggressive policies against the Republic

of Iraq, an editorial was published with the title, "You Lead the Country into Disaster." The opposition press and some *Medjlis* deputies duly point out the bankrupt adventurist character of the government's foreign policy. The opposition press also attacks the loan policy of the government and demands the extension of trade relations with the Socialist countries. National interest certainly demands an earliest possible change in the policy of government. At present, Turkey is at a political impasse.

A. Miller

The Social and Political Value of Sociometric Groupwork

The art of oral communication is essential to democracy, bridging the gap between the rulers and the ruled. Carefully-organized group discussions and sociodrama, as developed by J. L. Moreno, are methods of studying and implementing such communication patterns. This article first appeared in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR POLITIK, IV (No. 3, 1957), pp. 249-62, and was translated by Andrew Janos. It is presented here in abridged form; the deleted material deals with the minutiae of discussion procedure.

Isolation dominates the microsociological aspects of politics, though political leaders are careful to conceal the tendency. By "microsociological" we refer to the boundaries between political theory and practice, where institutions (parties, associations, etc.) and ideas (trends, theories) overlap. This isolation of the many from the few at the centers of decision-making is a politically decisive fact, and is the consequence of the lack of any face-to-face contact to bridge the gap between the "passivity of the masses" and the "activity of the apparatus."

There have been numerous efforts to create such a bridge, following the American pattern, by means of pseudo-religious activities (political demonstrations and personality cults) and theatrical devices (such as "shows," illustrated campaign material, films, etc.). However, intimate communication and its related thinking processes are necessarily lacking from

such mass activities. Democracy is the art of collective "talk," of conversation that cannot be based primarily on theoretical knowledge but on established patterns of exoteric behavior. The concept of an art of such oral communication is not new; Benjamin Franklin, as a member of the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen, laid special emphasis on the art and techniques of group discussion. Currently, the effectiveness of group work is being subject to systematic analysis, and is coming to be regarded as more important than individual roles or leadership patterns. This importance is apparent in the frequently cited development of the socio-intellectual qualities of the individual in a scientifically structured social context. Free from prejudices and pre-set theoretical approaches, the groupwork method presents an opportunity for intelligent discussion of current problems and gives the individual an oppor-

tunity to demonstrate responsibility. Group discussion is the democratic solution for bridging the gap between the rulers and the ruled.

The group discussion method is particularly germane to the characteristic socio-political communication patterns of a society of two classes — orders and indoctrination on the one hand, obeisance and attentiveness on the other. It necessitates vivid exchange and cooperation; the former instructor becomes a partner to the discussion, the listener an active participant having the opportunity to emerge as a socially responsible individual. The managerial elite, by contrast, uses the most current psychological methods to manipulate the instincts and emotions of the individual and the inert masses. Such methods do not require verbal contact and a feeling of partnership; not only can speech be dispensed with, it may even become an impediment. Only individuals with social responsibility can master the isolated and rapidly-moving technological and organizational processes of modern society, and resist such practices.

Speech has a maximum role in group discussions, which thereby become the most democratic form of political education. Verbal contacts leave greater leeway for conscious thinking than the mere perception of symbols and pictures. The success of group discussion depends on several factors, however, each of which must be considered in advance and controlled by the conference leader.

First, discussions must be arranged so as to avoid the use of authority or psycho-emotional devices and to eliminate certain rituals in the presentation of reports. There should be a preliminary conference attended by core members of the group to determine their attitudes and interests regarding the proposed topic, to work out questions of content and procedure, and to discuss the technical aspects of creating a favorable "organizational atmosphere," such as seating and table arrangements. Following the preliminary conference, materials such as

outlines, bibliographies, and demonstration setups can be prepared. If a conference is preceded with such lengthy preparations, control over the conduct of the sessions will always be maintained and preliminary evaluation will permit corrections to be made in the process of organization.

It is also important to recall that the informal aspects of group conferences offer the best opportunities for personal and intellectual exchanges. Addresses by external parties should be reduced to a minimum. This and the following information was gained from experience with weekend seminars on political science and sociology conducted by such German organizations as the Federal School "Hochkamp" of the DGB, the Lutheran Academy in Loccum, and the OTV Youth Organization, Hamburg; and also in academic courses with students of the Institute of Social Studies and Psycho-Hygiene, Bremen, at the Academy for Social Studies, Wilhelmshaven-Rustersiel, at the Economic Institute, Hamburg, and elsewhere.

[The first step in the conference procedure is for two discussion leaders to break up the central theme of discussion into two questions and, following "warm-up" sessions, to present them to the group. The intent is to give focus to the proceedings and to stimulate conscious cooperation and contributions on the part of the other participants. Next, seminar members form sub-groups of five or six members apiece, with the purpose of preparing answers for the questions, each sub-group member contributing a brief answer to each question. An alternative procedure of giving different questions to different groups has not proved advantageous for the discussion of political or sociological problems because it prevents a broad approach.

The sub-groups then convene together and list and discuss all answers. The apparent completeness of facts and newly won perspectives thus gained is then challenged, however, by transforming

each "answer" into a new question; "the progress of social theory and practice depends on the questionability of the existent and of the obvious." The process of transforming each answer into a new question takes place in the joint meeting. The new questions are then duplicated and distributed, and the participants rate the questions in terms of their currency and importance. This is the work of the first day of the conference; the six most highly-rated questions, three deriving from each of the two first-round questions, are the topics for the second day's discussions. An *ad hoc* discussion on the evening of the first day lays the groundwork for the second day's proceedings.

On the second day, the entire group meets to summarize and record the responses and supporting arguments. Discussion leaders of each sub-group give short reports, usually citing and circulating reference works with divergent outlooks. The second day concludes with a sociodrama, played by about six members, each of whom selects a distinct standpoint on the topic of the session; other members of the group observe and analyze the sociodrama. The players often assert themselves strikingly from the safety of their assumed roles; the camouflage of the role gives the player "the safety to expose."]

It is strongly pointed out to the entire group that the selection of questions for discussion has been the result of group action, whereby the group takes full responsibility for the further conduct of the discussion. A coherent topic has been broken up, the components transformed and synthesized in the form of pointed new questions and responses. It is obvious that the underlying concept is the belief that opinions from opposite positions can be communicated and result in the formation of new syntheses. The discussion leaders point out that each person present has been part of a

scientific work process fundamentally identical with a genuine democratic life process. The concluding point to be made at the conference is the overwhelming importance and irreplaceability of verbal communication, face-to-face cooperation, and the superiority of the thoughtful word over the technical manipulations with which the managerial class attempts to eliminate the process of thinking.

The immeasurable value of such sociometric groupwork in general lies in the fact — and this is the true political aspect of the method — that social, political, and other problems are approached by various means of oral expression (the several group methods, reports, and sociodrama), by which the problems are not only internalized through memory but also externalized through social, groupwork relations, and are made concrete and practical at the immediate, physical level. The *political* begins when we open our eyes and ears and become partners in a conversation, in sharp contrast to what Hegel thought of the philosophical.

At the end of the conference there is also an evaluatory session of the entire group, in which each member lists favorable and unfavorable comments and suggestions for future conferences. For the organizers, however, this final review and self-critique does not mean the end of the conference. The conference chairman, the discussion leaders, and the participating experts remain to measure the results collectively — for cooperation must be the basis of work at all levels of the social order. If these rules are observed with respect to content as well as to methodology and to the sociopsychological process, then the conference can be termed successful as a consciously democratic way of life: objects and processes are manipulated, and not people.

Hans H. Floeter

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- BARGHOORN, F. C., "America in 1959—As Seen from Moscow." *R. of Pol.*, XXII (April '60), 245-54. The Russian image of America still seemed "as much an instrument for the manipulation of foreign and Soviet public opinion as . . . a reflection of Moscow's appraisal of international political forces." At best it was only a "softened version of the Stalin-style image."
- BAIDMELL, J. H. *Communism in South East Asia*. N.Y.: Oxford U. Press, 1959, \$6.75. The impact of international Communism upon the countries of SE Asia, their reaction to this impact, and their influence in turn on Communism.
- CLARKE, J. A. *Research Materials in the Social Sciences*. Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1959, \$7.75. New edition of an annotated guide to bibliographies, newspapers and periodicals, manuscripts, dissertations, book reviews, statistics, and other source materials, with instructions for obtaining inter-library loans.
- "Computers in Behavioral Science." *Behavioral Sci.*, V (April '60), 170-91. A symposium, including L. Uhr, "Intelligence in Computers: The Psychology of Perception in People and Machines"; and C. Wrigley, "Theory Construction or Fact-Finding in a Computer Age?" suggesting that with computers "the search for functional relations can be carried out directly rather than by the mediation of theory."
- CONNERY, R. H., and R. H. LEACH, "Do We Need a Department of Urban Affairs?" *Western Pol. Q.*, XIII (March '60), 99-112. Arguments *pro* and *con*, concluding that an organizational reshuffling is not needed so much as "a policy to guide the federal government in its urban and metropolitan affairs."
- CONNERY, R. H., and R. H. LEACH. *The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1960, \$4.75. Surveys federal programs in metropolitan areas (housing, transportation, military installations, recreation, etc.) and urges stronger federal guidance and leadership.
- COTTA, A., "Le déclin de la domination économique d'une nation." *R. d'Econ. Pol.*, LXX (Jan.-Feb. '60), 35-68. States the nature of economic domination, draws on U.S. and UK data for evidence of decline, finds the concept of economic decline somewhat inapplicable and contradictory.
- DAVIS, M. W., and W. H. MALLORY, eds. *Political Handbook of the World*. N.Y.: Harper, 1960, \$4.50. New edition, listing parliaments, political parties, and newspapers of the world as of January 1, 1960.
- DAWSON, R. Y. *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941*. Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1959, \$6.00. Detailed analysis of the policy-making process that resulted in the decision to provide lend-lease, demonstrating the relation of the decision to U.S. foreign and military policies and to national politics and public opinion.
- Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and its Implications for United States Policy*. Prepared by Center for Intl. Studies, MIT, for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1960. Categorizes such nations as traditional, "committed in principle to modernization," or in process of development; lists the instruments of U.S. policy and their most effective uses.
- EMERSON, R. *From Empire to Nation*. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1960, \$7.75. Compares patterns of Afro-Asian nationalism with those of Western Europe.
- FREUND, L., "Zur Theorie der Freiheit." *Neue pol. Literatur*, V (Feb.-March '60), cols. 135-68.

- Comparative review of nine German works on freedom, including U. Schmidhäuser's *Welche Freiheit meinen wir?* (Stuttgart, '59); R. Berlinger's *Das Werk der Freiheit, Zur Philosophie von Geschichte, Kunst und Technik* (Frankfurt, '59); J. Hommes' *Krise der Freiheit* (Regensburg, '58); D. Sternberger's *Autorität, Freiheit und Befehlsgewalt* (Tübingen, '59).
- FREY, L., "La Démocratie objectivement définie." *R. Fran. de Sci. Pol.*, X (March '60), 67-82. Objective models of democracy in terms of interpersonal relations.
- GRAHAM, R. A. *Vatican Diplomacy*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton U. Press, 1957, \$7.50. History, nature, and organs of papal diplomacy, noting its modern administrative and legal aspects, and special problems of papal relations with the U.S. and the USSR.
- GREIBING, H., "Die Ideologie des Nationalsozialismus." *Pol. Studien*, XI (March '60), 165-72. Social-psychological analysis of National Socialism, emphasizing its relations to Hitler's character; drawn from the author's forthcoming *Der Nationalsozialismus—Ursprung und Wesen* (Munich: Isar Verlag).
- GSOVSKI, V., ed. *Government, Law, and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. N.Y.: Praeger, 1959, \$30.00 (2 vols.) Massive comparative study of law and government in the USSR and 10 satellite nations.
- HALL, E. T., "The Silent Language in Overseas Business." *Harvard Bus. R.*, XXXVIII (May-June '60), 87-96. Numerous cases in point that languages of time, space, things, friendship, and agreements are informal, "yet the rules governing their interpretation are surprisingly ironbound" and must be carefully learned by the U.S. businessman abroad.
- HARSANYI, J. C., "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science." *Behavioral Sci.*, V (April '60), 136-45. Social sciences place excessive reliance on static explanations of social arrangements, not enough on dynamic (i.e., historical) analysis. Develops heuristic criteria for judging explanatory value of social variables in dynamic analysis.
- HARTLEY, E. L., and G. D. WIEBE, eds. *Casebook in Social Processes*. N.Y.: Crowell, 1960, \$3.75 (paper). Portrait of social conditions, foreign relations, etc., derived from records of U.S. House and Senate hearings.
- HERRON, D. G., "The Franchise and New Zealand Politics 1853-8." *Pol. Sci.*, XII (March '60), 28-43. Analysis of voting records and contemporary sources indicates limited franchise was only one of many factors affecting politics; others were widespread election fixing, purchases of Maori votes, etc.
- HITCH, C. J., "National Security Policy as a Field for Economics Research." *World Pol.*, XII (April '60), 434-52. Research can contribute to analysis and measurement of economic strength for war, implications of large peace-time defense budgets, efficiency of resource use, economic warfare, etc.
- KAPP, K. W., "Economic Development, National Planning and Public Administration." *Kyklos*, XIII (#2, '60), 172-204. An inadequate or defective public administration system in an under-developed area "will not merely retard the development process but may defeat the entire development effort in an even more decisive manner than any temporary shortage of capital or inadequate technical skills."
- KOEN, R. Y. *The China Lobby in American Politics*. N.Y.: MacMillan, 1960, \$5.95. Techniques of intervention used by interested groups to affect U.S. policy toward China, identifies persons and groups involved, analyses effects of acceptance of their viewpoints on governmental and non-governmental bodies.
- KORNAI, J. *Overcentralization in Economic Administration*. N.Y.: Oxford U. Press, 1959, \$5.20 (trans. from Hungarian). "A Critical Analysis Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry," giving an internal view of the debate between economists and administrators in Hungary, 1955-56.
- KRIESBERG, L., "German Businessmen and Union Leaders and the Schuman Plan." *Soc. Sci.*, XXXV (April '60), 114-21. Extensive interviews indicate that participation in ECSC has somewhat favorably affected attitudes; criticism has developed over particular institutional manifestations.
- "L'évolution politique du Congo Belge et les autorités indigènes." *Problèmes d'Afrique Centrale*, XIII (#1, '59), 3-77. An issue devoted to such topics as "The Process of Congolese Political Evolution," "The Realities of Congolese Politics and the Indigenous Authorities," "The Concept of Power among the Indigenous Societies of the Congo," "The Traditional Authorities and the New Elite," etc.
- MABILEAU, A., "La Personnalisation du pouvoir dans les gouvernements démocratiques." *R. Fran. de Sci. Pol.*, X (March '60), 39-65. Increasing personalization of governmental power in one figure suggests a modified theory of democratic leadership.
- MCCLELLAN, D. S., and C. E. WOODHOUSE, "The Business Elite and Foreign Policy." *Western Pol. Q.*, XIII (March '60), 172-90. Finds business elite split between "progressives" and "fundamentalists," as evidenced in testimony on programs such as Point Four, IFC, DLF.
- MELLER, N., "Legislative Behavior Research." *Western Pol. Q.*, XIII (March '60), 131-53. Its intellectual foundations, chronology, and status, praising many developments but noting the incompleteness and conflicting findings of present work.
- MIDDLETON, D. *An Introduction to Statistical Communication Theory*. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1960, \$25.00. "A systematic approach to the design of optimal communication systems of various funda-

mental types, including an evaluation of performance and a comparison with nonoptimum systems for similar purposes," written principally for a technical audience.

MILBRATH, L. W., "Predispositions toward Political Contention." *Western Pol. Q.*; XIII (March '60), 5-18. Sociability, self-confidence, comfortable socio-economic status are dominant factors in predisposing a person toward political activity.

MITCHELL, A., "Flouridation in Dunedin: A Study of Pressure Groups and Public Opinion." *Pol. Sci.*, XII (March '60), 71-93. Comprehensive study of an American-style anti-flouridation campaign in a New Zealand city that resulted in a 2 to 1 referendum rejection of proposed flouridation.

MONNEROT, J. *Sociology and Psychology of Communism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, \$1.75 (paper; trans. from French).

OLIVERA, J. H. G., "Cyclical Economic Growth under Collectivism." *Kyklos*, XIII (#2, '60), 229-55. Develops an interpretive (as opposed to normative), dynamic model of collectivist economies which suggests the hypothesis of their cyclic growth, a hypothesis supported by recent evidence.

"On Freedom and Responsibility in Research." *Human Organization*, XVIII (Winter '60), 147-48. A policy statement of the Cornell Program in Social Psychiatry that outlines "the mutual obligations . . . among staff members of an inter-disciplinary research project" regarding publication of results.

POLLOCK, F. *An Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1890, 1960, \$1.75 (paper reprint).

FORTA, G. D., "Considerazioni sulla teoria e sulla politica dello sviluppo economico." *Rivisti di Pol. Econ.*, III (March '60), 493-525. Definitions, genesis of the doctrine of economic development, the political dilemma of agriculture vs. industry, internal and international obstacles, technological problems, and prospects.

RISCHIN, M. "Our Own Kind." Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960, free (paper). Finds noticeable differences in voting patterns among ethnic and religious groups, as well as differences within such groups along economic lines; suggests that "the ethnic factor is second only to the economic factor in influencing an American's vote."

RISLER, M., "L'évolution de la condition des étudiants de la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle à 1959." *Cahiers du Musée Social*, (Jan.-Feb. '60), 3-19. The growth of France's student bodies and subjects of study in relation to national and international developments and intellectual movements.

RODRIGUEZ, A. P., "Cuantificación de las clases medias Españolas." *Revista Intl. de Soc.*, XVII (Oct.-Dec. '59), 559-70. Tabulations of lower- and middle-class groupings in Spain with methodological and interpretive comments; the groups are almost equal in size, 4.4 millions and 4.0 millions respectively.

ROSTOW, W. W. *The Stages of Economic Growth*. N.Y.: Cambridge U. Press, 1960. First book appearance of a much-discussed new theory. Its stages are five: traditional; exploitation and development of infra-structure; rapid growth in key economic sectors; technological maturity; and, at the final stage, a choice among providing greater social security and leisure, expansion of international power, or high mass consumption. The USSR has arrived at the choice point of the fifth stage.

ROTHCHILD, D. S. *Toward Unity in Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960, \$5.00. Describes, analyzes the governmental organizations and the federation movement in British Africa to determine trends of constitutional development.

ROYER, J., "La structure économique des pays industriels: est-elle compatible avec les besoins de développement économique des pays neufs?" *Econ. appliquée*, XII (Oct.-Dec. '59), 483-520. The balance of payments problems are crucial for underdeveloped countries; solution lies in increased Western willingness to increase purchases of their raw goods and consumer products, even at the expense of some internal Western agriculture and light industry.

RUSSO, F., "La création scientifique et technique." *Etudes*, XCIII (April '60), 28-40. Characteristics of social and technical invention, relations to culture and to labor.

SCAMMON, R. M., ed. *America Votes No. 3*. Pittsburgh: U. of Pittsburgh Press, 1959, \$12.50. Third biennial edition of a handbook of raw election statistics, Presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial, by State.

SCOTT, R. E. *Mexican Government in Transition*. Urbana: U. of Illinois Press, 1959, \$5.75. Comprehensively analyzes governmental structure, physical and social setting, people, political party system, electoral process, and presidency, 1910-1959.

SHILS, E., "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States." *World Pol.*, XII (April '60), 329-68. The means by which the intellectual elites, comprised of all persons with advanced education, have attained political preeminence, who they are, their political outlooks, and their prospects.

SHILS, E., "Political Development in the New States." *Comp. Studies in Society and Hist.*, II (April '60), 265-92. Interprets aspirations to modernity in terms of the resultant political order, which is in turn determined by social structure, cultural tradition, and human qualities and skills.

SIMON, Y. R., "Common Good and Common Action." *R. of Pol.*, XXII (April '60), 202-44. "Author-

- ity, in certain cases and domains, is made necessary not by human deficiencies but by the very nature of man and society." Its counterpart, autonomy, "implies the interiority of the law."
- SOROKIN, P. A., "How are Sociological Theories Conceived, Developed, and Validated?" *Soc. Sci.*, XXXV (April '60), 78-91. Great discoveries are always accomplished through the cooperation of "superconscious genius or intuition," "rational, logico-mathematical thought," and "sensory perception and observation." Only mediocre creative results can be achieved without intuition.
- TAFT, R., "A Statistical Analysis of Personality Theories." *Acta Psychologica*, XVII (#1, '60), 80-88. Distinguished five "clusters" of personality theories, on the basis of 18 dimensions; for other social scientists, a useful introduction to current theories.
- TENBRUCK, F. H., "Die Genesis der Methodologie Max Webers." *Kölner. Zeit. für Soz. und Sozialpsych.*, XI (#4, '60), 573-630. Thorough analysis of Weber's works, emphasizing his concepts of objectivity as a reaction against naturalism.
- TOMPKINS, D. L. C. *The Supreme Court of the United States*. Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, U. of Calif., 1959, \$4.50. A bibliography covering the past 20 years, with interpolated commentary.
- WILLSON, F. M. G., "Cases and Case Study: American and British." *Pub. Admin.*, XXXVIII (Spring '60), 61-66. Administrative case studies are beginning to be made in Britain, but concentrate largely on "the pathology of the routine process."
- WOLFE, D. *Science and Public Policy*. Lincoln, Neb.: U. of Nebraska Press, 1959, \$1.50 (paper). Responsibilities of industry, the federal government, and education in resolving the problems provoked by the scientific revolution in a democratic society.

ON THE COVER: Cross-sections of a plan of commercial development along Ataturk Bouvelard in Istanbul, proposed by a merchants' cooperative.

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Two Centuries of Encyclopedism are Enough

(AN EDITORIAL)

A General Electric physicist, Harvey Einbinder, attacked the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in the Columbia University *Forum* for January. He termed it antiquated, inaccurate, and commercialized. The *Encyclopedia's* Chairman of the Board, Robert M. Hutchins, and Dr. Einbinder argue the charges in the current issue of *Forum*.

We stand with Dr. Einbinder on the matter. Certainly, this huge compendium is worth something. We use our copy regularly, because there is nothing much better. But if there is any ideal of an encyclopedia, the *Britannica* falls far short of it. It is a patched-up centenarian. It has two sets of maps, both mediocre. It has reams of useless statistics. Scarcely an entry in social science includes the best work of the last generation. Many everyday concepts of social science are absent. There is an ancient article on "celibacy," which is theological and legal in its treatment and ignores social psychology, but no article on "centralization." Recently we had occasion to check a list of key terms on behalf of a new dictionary of political science and were dismayed at the fundamental inadequacy of the *Encyclopedia*. Modern intellectual leaders often are entered, but briefly treated. Max Weber receives one-fourth the space of the British dramatist, John Webster, and one-sixth that of "Weber's Law" (psychology). The obscure English baronets have been largely weeded out but the atmosphere is still that of nineteenth century England.

The *Encyclopedia*, speaking through Dr. Hutchins, claims credit for revising 34,000,000 words between 1950 and 1959. Since the total wordage of the 1960 edition is 40,000,000, some bizarre computations must be occurring. Does "revise" mean "examined with some chance of being changed"? Is the Yearbook counted? How many of these words dealt with ephemeral social figures, how many with current events such as the Korean War, how many with new films? How many more stylish photographs were added? This statistic is a Pandora's Box that had better stay closed. Dr. Hutchins also declares, "One thing can be said with certainty, and that is that the *Britannica* reflects modern scholarship. In the 1960 edition there are articles by forty winners of the Nobel Prize." A dislike of statistics, as of horses and children, often causes abuse. This "certainty" is not only uncertain on its face (40 articles are what percentage of the *Britannica*?) but a delusion, produced, as every encyclopedia drudge knows, by souping up the product with famous names.

Dr. Einbinder should be commended for his courage and zeal for the public welfare. He promises now to write a book on the subject. The *Encyclopedia Britannica* should subsidize him. Considering the rare value of such services and the money the *Britannica* spends for publicity and sales, I should think that \$50,000 would be a fair fee. It would be the first step towards what would be an inevitable conclusion.

Like an old battleship, the *Britannica* should be respectfully piloted around the world and then scrapped. Let the final grand tour of the old hulk be touted by the people who have made money from it. Meanwhile, a new "encyclopedia" should be designed to replace it, reaching a newly defined audience, giving weights to entries according to new values of time, space, and intellect, and incorporating the revolutions in communications, aesthetics, new specialized sciences, and forms of graphic presentation. This would be a noble task for Dr. Hutchins himself. A true test of the imagination and intellect lies in the construction of an "encyclopedia" for the new age.

